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Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and 
Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses
John Heathershaw1
This  paper  assesses  the  discursive  environment  of  post-conflict  intervention  as  a  prism 
through which to view the international politics of the post-Cold War era.   I argue that the 
‘liberal peace’ is not a single discourse but  a tri-partite international discursive environment 
that  dynamically  reproduces  technical  solutions  which  fail  to  address  the  core  issues  of 
conflict in a given place.  The paper starts from the assumption that over the last twenty years 
we have seen a shift from an understanding of peace as a state of affairs in a given territory 
(as  explored  by  Michael  Banks  in  a  1987 paper)  to  peace  as  a  process  of  post-conflict 
intervention;  a move from peace to peacebuilding. This ‘liberal  peace’ sets a standard by 
which ‘failed states’ and ‘bad civil  societies’ are  judged according to ethical,  spatial  and 
temporal markers.  However, the apparent homogeneity of the model obscures the divisions 
and mergers which characterise the scholarship and practice of international peacebuilding. 
The boundaries of the peace debate remain; the political differences latent in Banks’ three 
concepts are retained in the evolving discourses of democratic peacebuilding, civil society 
and  statebuilding.   The paper  shows how these  three  basic  discourses  are  reproduced  in 
international policy analyses and major academic works.  Moreover, the discursive mediation 
of  their  differences  is  the  dynamic  by  which  the  liberal  peace  is  sustained,  despite  its 
detachment from the lived experiences of post-conflict environments.  It is in this sense that 
we can comprehend international peacebuilding as a virtual phenomenon, maintained in the 
verbal  and  visual  representations  of  international  organisations,  diplomats  and  academic 
policy-practitioners.  In light of this disaggregation of the discursive environment, a better, 
more nuanced understand of the liberal peace can be attained; one that is able to grasp how 
critics and criticisms become incorporated into that which they seek to critique.  The paper 
concludes  with  three  propositions  regarding  the  nature  of  world  order  in  the  era  of  the 
tripartite ‘liberal peace’.  During this time coercion, military force and even warfare have 
become  standard  and  legitimate  features  of  peacefare.   The  discursive  dynamics  of 
international  peacebuilding  illustrate  how  peace  has  become  ever  more  elusive  in 
contemporary international politics.  
Introduction
The concept of peace was central to the early inquiries of International Relations yet in 
the Cold War era it was pushed to the margins of the discipline.  Michael Banks’ 1987 
tripartite rendition of the concept of peace in international conflict  resolution2 –  as 
1 This article benefited from the comments and criticisms of numerous colleagues, in 
particular John Darby, Mark Hoffman, Michael Pugh, Oliver Richmond, Peter Wallensteen, 
two anonymous reviewers and the editors of Milliennium.  However, any shortcomings are 
solely the responsibility of the author.  
2 In fact Banks’ paper outlined four concepts including peace as harmony.  This fourth 
approach is dismissed by Banks himself, and has been excluded here, as it does not 
characterise any approaches to peacebuilding within the international community. Michael 
Banks, ‘Four Conceptions of Peace’, in Conflict management and problem solving : interpersonal 
to international applications, eds Denis J. D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste. (London: F. 
conflict  management,  as  order,  and  as  justice  –  illustrated  shortcomings  in  the 
theorisation  of  each  of  these  concepts  which largely  remain today,  despite  some 
promising recent works.3  This paper uses discourses of post-conflict intervention as a 
prism through which to view this process of change in international politics.  It re-
examines international peacebuilding as found in the global spaces of the ‘international 
community’4 – an emerging identity-group for the management of post-colonial and 
post-conflict spaces in world politics.  Yet rather than assess world order in terms of a 
singular  ‘liberal  peace’,  I  provide  an  analysis  of  how such  order  is  dynamically 
produced and reproduced in  the  inter-textual  relations between three discourses of 
peacebuilding5 which echo Banks’ three concepts of peace.    
The paper is divided into three parts.  Part one introduces the basic discourse of 
democratic peacebuilding which was developed by the United Nations, major donors 
and analysts in the immediate post-Cold War period.  It shows how it is not just a form 
of praxis but represents peacebuilding as a process of post-conflict democratisation.  In 
part two, I position this basic discourse in what I characterise as a tripartite discursive 
environment of peacebuilding and chart its similarities and differences with Banks’ 
peace  framework.  Part  three  considers  its  two  contending  siblings,  civil  society 
(ascendant from the mid-1990s) and  statebuilding  (ascendant post-9/11), and shows 
how they divide from democratic peacebuilding in contemporary international debates. 
The fourth part illustrates how contending representations merge into a dominant meta-
narrative,  pragmatic  peacebuilding,  which  generates  international  intervention  for 
virtual world order.  
A Unified Liberal Peacebuilding?
Peacebuilding is  an over-worked yet under-developed idea.  Despite being used to 
mobilise significant political and economic resources for increasingly intrusive third-
party interventions, peacebuilding is apparently little more than a composite of neo-
liberal problem-solving strategies – a form of praxis rather than a theory or concept. 
Whilst Lund argues that a unified understanding has emerged which constitutes ‘an 
overarching  multidimensional  concept  of  peacebuilding’,6 its  practice,  he 
acknowledges,  remains ‘a  huge,  hopeful  experiment whose results  are  not  clear’.7 
Much verbiage is  expended in  an  attempt to  define  it  in  sufficient  breadth.8  Yet 
definitions remain vague.  Ball, for example, remarks that peacebuilding ‘requires that 
conflict resolution and consensus-building shape all interactions among citizens and 
Pinter, 1987), 259-274.
3 Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); MacGinty, 
Roger, No War, No Peace, (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan 2006). 
4 Hereafter the idea of ‘international community’ will be capitalised to International 
Community to convey its centrality as an identity signifier in peacebuilding discourse. 
5 I will continue to use ‘peacebuilding’ as a short hand for the discourses of 
international peacebuilding.  
6 Michael Lund, What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Taking Stock of Post-Conflict  
Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions,  a paper for the International Development 
Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada (January 2003), 13.
7 Ibid, 16.
8 For a wideners’ perspective see Henning Haugerudbraaten, ‘Peacebuilding: six dimensions 
and two concepts.’ African Security Review 7, no.6 (1998), available from: 
http://www.iss.co.za/ASR/7No6/Peacebuilding.html, accessed: 12 December 2004; for a 
reformist perspective see Lund, What Kind of Peace is Being Built?; for a radical perspective 
see, Alejandro Bendaña, What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Critical Assessments from the South, 
paper for the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, Jan 2003. Available 
at: www.action.web.ca; accessed: 29 June 2004
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between citizens and the state’.9  Surveys of the literature often conclude with a re-
statement of fundamental questions about peacebuilding’s practices and effects.10  I 
argue that the reasons for this inexactitude are not merely found in the aversion to 
rigorous conceptual analysis which is typical of policy-practitioners.  A further problem 
is that no sooner had peacebuilding emerged as an international discourse than its 
proponents had begun to be challenged by advocates of alternative approaches to post-
conflict intervention.
The UN’s ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ emerged amid a reawakening of liberal 
internationalist ideals in the international community in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Democratisation  can  be  considered  its  discursive  cousin,  sharing  peacebuilding’s 
epistemological and ontological roots, and being hugely influential in its own right, 
informing international engagement with post-Soviet and post-colonial states.11 This 
link between peacebuilding, democratisation and even development is explicit in the 
policy literature.12  Boutros-Ghali was no less totalising in a 1993 speech:
Without peace there can be no development and there can be no democracy.  Without 
development, the basis for democracy will be lacking and societies will tend to fall 
into  conflict.   And  without  democracy,  no  sustainable  development  will  occur; 
without such development, peace cannot long be maintained.13 
In this vein, peacebuilding texts reflect the holistic imaginary of this approach and have 
served to broaden its application across dimensions (from security to psycho-social) 
and deployments.  Much of this literature is itself located within the liberal conflict 
management tradition14, and most clearly exhibited today in the work of Michael Doyle 
on the democratic peace ‘between’ states as well as peacebuilding ‘within’ them.15 
Thus, the discourse of democratic peacebuilding presents a transition from war to peace 
with the elusive and illusory endpoint of a ‘liberal democratic peace’.16
An  ideologically-informed  ethical  stance  lies  at  the  heart  of  any  policy 
discourse, perhaps especially one which is represented as pragmatic.  In the case of 
democratic peacebuilding the ethics of liberal internationalism configured a particular 
9 Nicole Ball, ‘The Reconstruction of War-Torn Societies and State Institutions: How Can 
External Actors Contribute?’, in Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in 
Crisis Regions, Ed. Tobias Debiel with Alex Klein, (London: Zed 2002), 37
10 Michelle I. Gawerc, ‘Peace-building: theoretical and concrete perspectives,’ Peace and 
Change  31, no.4 (2006): 435-478.
11 Samuel P. Huntington, The third wave: democratisation in the late twentieth century, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Guillermo O’Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
Transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the 
market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 19991).
12 See, for example, Airat R. Aklaev, Democratisation and Ethnic Peace  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1999); Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckham, eds., Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of 
Institutional Choice in Conflict Torn Societies (London: Zed Books, 2003); Tobias Debiel and 
Alex Klein, eds., Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence, and Development in Crisis Regions 
(London: Zed 2002).
13 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report on the work of the organisation from the forty-seventh to the 
forty-eight session of the general assembly (New York: United Nations, 1993), no pagination.
14 Banks, ‘Four Concepts of Peace’, 271
15 Michael W. Doyle, ‘Liberalism in World Politics’. American Political Science Review 80, 
no. 4  (1986): 1151-69; Michael W. Doyle, and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Bulding 
Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
16 MacGinty, No War, No Peace.
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response to violent conflict.  Developing in tandem with the first George Bush’s hopes 
for ‘new world order’ and with Boutros-Ghali’s aspirations to a stronger role for the 
United Nations, it was born amid the latter’s  Agenda for Peace (AfP) in 1992.  The 
‘new interventionism’ of the UN emerged from a sense of optimism engendered by the 
end of the Cold War – an ‘interregnum moment’ akin to 1919 or 1945.17  Inspired by a 
reductive and teleological informed reading of the significance of 1989, the burgeoning 
optimism of the post-Cold War period was the defining force in the birth of the concept 
of peacebuilding.18  A new parlance soon emerged to offer hope of a practicable model 
for  this  new-found enthusiasm and optimism.   Along with  concepts of  preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement was the idea of ‘post-
conflict peacebuilding’.  This was defined, in consciously pragmatic terms as, ‘action to 
identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to 
avoid  a  relapse  into  conflict’.19  AfP suggested  a  wide  range  of  ‘post-conflict 
peacebuilding’ tasks including  inter alia ‘monitoring elections, advancing efforts to 
protect  human  rights,  reforming  or  strengthening  governmental  institutions,  and 
promoting formal and informal processes of political participation’.20  Despite the clear 
pragmatic compromises entailed in such a rendition of peacebuilding – a statement of 
intent so broad as to provide a task for almost every agency of the UN system – the 
ethics of liberal-democracy were explicit in peacebuilding from the beginning.  As 
noted by Boutros-Ghali,
 
There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of 
law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and 
security in any new and stable political order.21
 
Thus, despite its veneer of pragmatism, from its outset, ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ 
was discursively linked to liberal democracy.
I use neoliberalism, in the sense used by Gill22, to characterise the ideological 
and  ethical  orientation  of  peacebuilding,  a  post-1989  discourse  of  international 
intervention.  Neoliberalism arose as a disciplinary critique of Keynesianism and state 
socialism.  It was born in the field of economics in the work of Milton Friedman and 
others of the Chicago School of the 1960s.  While it was deployed in the 1980s to 
adjust the management of the global economy and certain Western national economies, 
a new generation of economists began to advocate that such practices can be fomented 
in other parts of the world via international interventions and institution-building.23  It 
thus developed from its disciplinary origins to a form of praxis, adjusted and adapted in 
context, but always in terms supportive of international political and economic order. 
Such  approaches reflect  a  rationalist  understanding  of  human affairs,  one  which 
embodies a problem-solving ethos and assumes a universal ethical framework.  This 
outlook is conveyed paradigmatically by Francis Fukuyama’s  End of History thesis.24 
Neo-liberalism’s  strategies  or  ‘technologies  of  governing’25,  such  as  ‘structural 
17 Ibid., ch.1.




22 Stephen Gill, ‘Globalization, market civilization and disciplinary neo-liberalism’, 
Millennium 24, no.3 (1995): 399-423.
23 Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as exception: mutations in citizenship and sovereignty, (Durham 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006).
24 Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man, (New York: Free Press, 1992).
25 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception.
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adjustment’,  ‘good  governance’ and  ‘civil  society’,  are  born  out  of  these  ethics. 
Bertram defines UN peacebuilding in messianic terms.  
Designed  to  address  the  root  causes  of  conflict,  it  entails  building  the  political 
conditions for a sustainable democratic peace, generally in countries long divided by 
social strife, rather than keeping or enforcing peace between hostile states and armed 
parties.26 
Sisk, furthermore, asserts the ethical foundations of this approach in unequivocal terms. 
‘In  sum’, he notes, ‘there is  simply no  more just  or legitimate way to peacefully 
manage differences among contending social groups than democracy, however difficult 
it may seem to move from violent to electoral competition’.27  
A Tripartite Discursive Environment
The explicit pragmatism of such policy-prescriptive statements obscures some very real 
differences and stymies meaningful debate between interveners.  The race to prescribe 
– to solve problems and find solutions – has plagued peace research from its beginnings 
as a field.  In Robert Cox’s  terms28,  it  is a form of  problem-solving,  understood in 
contrast to critical theory.29  This contradiction was already apparent to Schmid in the 
1960s who remarked insightfully that ‘the universalist ethos of peace research becomes 
operationalised  into  identification  with  the  interests  of  the  existing  international 
system’.  Thus, it ‘becomes a factor supporting the status quo of the international power 
structure,  providing the decision-makers of the system with knowledge for control, 
manipulation and integration of the system’.30 Peacebuilding is no less politicised and, 
it is argued here, equally susceptible to the power dynamics that Schmid identified in 
peace research forty years ago.   Buzan’s critique that peace ‘has failed to generate a 
comprehensive alternative approach to  the study of international relations’ remains 
valid in the peacebuilding era.31  
As Cox and Schmid would recognise, peacebuilding is more than a form of 
praxis;  crucially  it  is  a  discourse.   In  such  terms  we  can  begin  to  understand 
peacebuilding in its fullness – how and why it is ‘expressive’, or ‘a way to stand for 
and promote certain ideals’.32  Therefore, at first sight, peacebuilding seems to be the 
very opposite of ‘supporting the status quo’.  It is a normative approach to intervention 
which ostensibly demands fundamental institutional changes in post-conflict spaces.  It 
is variously both idealist and pragmatic, performative yet instrumental, interpretatively 
made and experimentally remade.  Experiments ‘on the ground’ are conceived in a 
particularly normalising fashion, where it is ‘the other’ of a conflict zone, rather than 
26 Eva Bertram, ‘Reinventing Governments: the promises and perils of United Nations peace 
building.’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no.3 (1995), 388
27 Timothy Sisk, ‘Democratisation and Peacebuilding: Perils and Promises,’ in Turbulent Peace: 
The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson 
and Pamela Aall, (Washington: USIP 2001), 786.
28 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory,’ in Approaches to World Order, ed. Timothy J. Sinclair  (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 88.
29 See also A.B. Fetherstone, ‘Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A 
Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks,’ International Peacekeeping 17, no.2 (2000): 
190-217.
30 Herman Schmid, ‘Peace Research and Politics’, Journal of Peace Research 5, no. 3 (1968), 
229
31 Barry Buzan, ‘Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International 
Relations’, Journal of Peace Research 21, no.2 (1984), 125.
32 Lund, ‘What kind of peace?’, 22
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international political and economic structures themselves, which must undergo change 
to correspond to mythologised international standards.33  The reliance upon problem-
solving which this entails has suggested, to many, that the ideals of peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping  provide  a  veneer  which  barely  obscures  the  policing  goals  of 
international actors.34   
However, many critics of peacebuilding make two analytical missteps which 
this paper seeks to correct.  Firstly, they assume peacebuilding discourse is a cynical 
construct which barely conceals the true aims of international actors.35  In reality, few 
peacebuilders are  cynics  and  few would  see  themselves as  representatives of  the 
community policing arm of an imperial power.  Often markedly internationalist and 
evangelical, peacebuilders depart significantly from the territorial and timeless national 
(security) discourses more often studied and deployed by scholars of  International 
Relations.   The  inclusive  worldview  of  peacebuilding  requires  the  simultaneous 
construction of both ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ in the other – that is that friend and enemy 
exist  in  the same time and space.  In  the discourse of  peacebuilding ‘friend’ and 
‘enemy’ may even be found in the same individual who is faced with a truncated choice 
of playing the role of ‘spoiler’36 or a participant in the process.  As such the subject is 
divided, with his/her ethical and political potential taken out of his/her hands and made 
a product of his/her relationship with the international community.  Peacebuilding’s 
world is one of bifurcated time, space and ethics: them and us, then and now, bad and 
good.  It is a world divided between the ‘enemy-other’ (of the past, fundamentalist 
ethics and ethnic identity) and an ‘ideal-other’ (of the future, rationalist ethics and civic 
identity).  The ideal-other is similarly reproduced via the ‘us’/’them’ boundary where 
‘they’ should  become what  ‘we’ imagine ourselves to  be.   This  act  of  inscription 
provides meaning, credibility and even legitimacy to interventions.  It constructs both 
‘us’ and ‘them’ in terms of ethical, temporal and spatial markers.37  
Secondly, and most importantly, many consider peacebuilding to be a single 
discourse of a singular liberal peace.38  However, peacebuilding is not homogenous. 
Rather than analyse a  single  international peacebuilding  we must explore multiple 
discourses of  the  liberal peace.  In  short  we must  shift  our  analytical  gaze from 
peacebuilding to peacebuildings.  I distinguish three ‘basic discourses’ which constitute 
‘the main structural positions’39 within the debate in the International Community:  
(i) peacebuilding-via-democratic reform (the original configuration which I 
refer to above as ‘democratic peacebuilding’),
(ii) peacebuilding-via-civil society (‘civil society’),
33 It is also true that every major UN report on peace operations over the last fifteen years has 
recommended some kind of institutional change for the UN.  These technical solutions 
indicate the self-referential nature of peacebuilding whilst leaving unaddressed the broader 
structures of international order.
34 David Chandler, Bosnia: faking democracy after Dayton (London: Pluto Press, 1999); 
François Debrix, Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilisation of 
Ideology, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Michael Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping 
and Critical Theory.’ International Peacekeeping 11, no.1, (2004): 39–58.
35 Chandler, Bosnia.
36 Stephen J. Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security, 22:2 
(1997): 5-53.
37 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (London: 
Routledge 2006).
38 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).
39 Hansen, Security as Practice.
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(iii) peacebuilding-via-statebuilding (‘statebuilding’).  
This tripartite rendition of peacebuilding is broadly analogous to Banks’ concepts of 
peace; conflict management, justice and order.40  The value of Banks’ framework is that 
it captures a fundamental conflict between the key ‘meta-ideas’41 of political thought: 
liberty, justice and order.  This tripartite division is similar to the three gradations of the 
liberal peace – orthodox, emancipatory and conservative – identified in Richmond’s 
germinal study.42  This paper seeks to take up his challenge of developing ‘a research 
agenda on the different components of the liberal peace’.43  An analogical tabulation of 
concepts of peace and discourses of peacebuilding is shown below (fig. 1).  
Fig. 1: Concepts of peace and discourses of peacebuilding 
Concepts of peace 
(Banks 1987)





Conflict management Orthodox Democratic peacebuilding
Justice Emancipatory Civil Society
Order Conservative Statebuilding
This schematic is at best a rough sketch of the overlaps between peace concepts 
and peacebuilding discourses.  However,  it  is  not too  much of a  stretch to locate 
proponents of civil society such as Kaldor44 in a justice tradition, and proponents of 
statebuilding such as Berger & Scowcroft45 as advocates for international and domestic 
order.  Equally, it is not overly contrived to contrast the work of Lederach46 with that of 
Fukuyama47 as they are broadly addressing the same questions of conflict resolution but 
from very different perspectives.  The possibilities and limits of the analogousness of 
concepts of peace and discourses of peacebuilding are most pronounced in Banks work. 
In so far as he himself favoured peace-as-conflict-management from within the liberal 
or rationalist tradition – ‘a dynamic state of affairs in which the essential properties 
arise from how we do things not what we do’48 – he represents the optimism of the 
dawn of peacebuilding in the late-1980s.  Banks argued that a justice-based approach is 
concerned  with  poverty-alleviation  and  self-determination,  concerns  which  are 
paramount in civil society peacebuilding today.  By contrast he remarks that peace-as-
order proponents seek ‘life made predictable and relatively safe’.49  In international 
40 Banks, ‘Four Concepts of Peace’
41 The term ‘meta-ideas’ is used with respect to the concept of peace in MacGinty, No War, No 
peace, 19.
42 Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, 214.
43 Ibid., 230.
44 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press 2001); Mary Kaldor, ‘Reconceptualising Organised Violence,’ in Re-imagining Political 
Community: studies in cosmopolitan democracy, eds. Daniele Archibugi, David Held and 
Martin Köhler, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998): 91-110
45 Samuel R. Berger & Brent Scowcroft, ‘In the Wake of War: Getting Serious about Nation-
Building’, National Interest 81 (Fall 2005): 49-53.
46 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace, (New 
York: OUP, 2005).
47 Francis Fukuyama, State-building: governance and world order in the 21st century, (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press 2004).
48 Banks, ‘Four Concepts of Peace’, 269
49 Ibid., 261.
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relations this means they describe and prescribe ‘an ordered hierarchy which maintains 
a rudimentary form of world government whereby the affairs of the smaller and weaker 
states are directed by the larger and more powerful ones’.50  Such assessments seem at 
once to depart from the unilateralism of neo-conservative American statebuilders yet 
eerily foreshadow critical analyses of imperial statebuilding in Kosovo, Afghanistan 
and Iraq51 and the development of a new norm of contingent or ‘positive’ sovereignty 
which makes such practices legitimate.52        
The response from within peace studies to this muddying of their foundational 
concept and ethic has often been incoherent.  In the recent second edition of a leading 
survey,  Ramsbotham,  Woodhouse,  and  Miall  assert  the  need  to  rediscover  the 
foundational concepts of the field.
We have aimed to reclaim terms such as conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation […] from those who misuse them, by explaining clearly how they are 
understood within the conflict resolution tradition.  As in the case of appeals to 
freedom and democracy, we argue that those who invoke these concepts should 
ensure that their purposes and actions are consonant with them – or else stop using 
such language.53
The authors do not imply that there are such things as ‘conflict resolution’ or ‘peace’ 
out there, objectively existing in the world, the blueprint to which is waiting to be 
discovered by mankind, but  merely claim that  there is  an appropriate tradition of 
interpretation that should be adhered to.  However, such normative re-statements of a 
peace tradition are chimerical and risk making the field irrelevant  to the empirical 
questions of peacebuilding.   As Buzan notes essentially contested concepts such as 
peace cannot simply be fixed or ‘defined in strict terms’.54  Peace and peacebuilding, 
according to such a view, ‘represent durable and coherent domains of concern’ which 
‘have their own set of norms and assumptions’ as well as ‘containing contradictions, 
which is what prevents their being expressed in universally accepted definitions’.55  As 
such peace and peacebuilding  are  not  terms with  a  proper descriptive  utility  and 
normative value which can be  ‘reclaimed’ but  they are political  discourses which 
represent and serve to justify certain political interests and ideas. 
My approach is through discourse analysis and is but one of many attempts to 
probe the problematic of peace.  Some conceptualisations of peace or peacebuilding 
conflate  meta-epistemological  sources,  meta-ideas  and  concepts.   MacGinty,  for 
example,  identifies  three  meta-ideas  of  the  religious-spiritual,  humanity  and 
sustainability.56  In reality, secular humanism and religious faith can provide inspiration 
and support to all three concepts of peace outlined above.   Richmond, by contrast, 
identifies nine concepts or ‘main methods’ of peace, the features of many of which are 
reframed in my tripartite framework.57  The relatively parsimonious approach adopted 
50 Ibid.
51 Simon Chesterman, ‘Bush, the United Nations and Nation-building,’ Survival 46, no.1 
(2004): 101-116; David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building, (London: 
Pluto, 2006).
52 Dominc Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International 
Statebuilding (Oxford: OUP, 2007).
53 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary conflict resolution: the 
prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts (Cambridge: Polity, 2005, 2nd 
ed), xiii.
54 Buzan, ‘Peace, Power and Security’, 125
55 Ibid.
56 MacGinty, No War, No Peace, 19-24.
57 Richmond, The Transformation of Peace.
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here may raise as many questions (and potentially obscure as many differences) as it 
provides answers.  It risks oversight and conflation whilst seeking to avoid confusion 
and obfuscation.  This paper ignores critical discourses such as those identified and 
advocated by  inter  alia  Bendana and Fetherstone.58  More importantly  it  excludes 
grounded local  and  regional  discourses of  peace  which  generate  context-specific 
responses to international intervention in post-conflict environments.  In my own work 
on Tajikistan, I  have identified basic popular and elite  discourses which not  only 
determine local and regional reactions but also serve as foundations for the peace that 
has  emerged  there  since  the  late-1990s.59  Yet  my  research  also  indicates  that 
international peacebuilding discourses tend to be reproduced internationally even when 
their  impact on  their  target  populations  is  negligible  or  even counter-productive.60 
Thus, the concern in this paper is to highlight the endogenous dynamics of discursive 
reproduction  and evolution  in  the  international  context.  Nevertheless  it  serves as 
merely an initial or basic illustration of the discursive environment of the so-called 
liberal peace.
Dividing: civil society versus statebuilding
The ethical, spatial and temporal orientations of democratic  peacebuilding are to a 
certain extent shared by civil society and statebuilding discourses.  Indeed, the inter-
textual links between the three are so voluminous that it is difficult to separate them for 
the purpose of  analysis.   Most  analysts,  following Paris61,  simply  discuss  a  single 
discourse of  the ‘liberal peace’.   However,  such critiques often obscure important 
differences  that  have  emerged  in  the  fifteen  years  since  Boutros  Boutros-Ghali 
launched Agenda for Peace.  On the one hand, advocates of ‘civil society’ have argued 
for  NGOs  as  agents of  peacebuilding from the  ‘bottom-up’;  engaging in  complex 
emergencies through conflict prevention, multi-track diplomacy and the creation of 
‘local  capacities  for  peace’.62  On  the  other  hand,  the  recent  enthusiasm  for 
‘statebuilding’  from  the  ‘top-down’  seeks  stabilisation,  security  first  and 
‘institutionalisation-before-liberalisation’.63  The  contentions  between  these  two 
approaches (or discourses) represent the terms of the peacebuilding debate over the last 
fifteen years.  More importantly,  conservative statebuilding and  humanitarian civil 
society offer contrasting emphases in terms of space, and contending ethical stances of 
order and justice.  While in the 1990s, the international community rushed to civil 
society as an engine of social justice, in recent years – particularly since September 
11th,  2001,  and the  launch of  the  ‘war  on  terror’ –  statebuilding  has  gained new 
currency among many in the international community, particularly the US Government. 
Civil Society: peace-as-justice 
The idea of ‘civil society’ as an agent of post-conflict change emerges from a justice 
ethic that has been at the heart of peace studies since its genesis during the Cold War. 
Galtung’s work on positive peace, as well as other foundational peace studies work 
58 Bendana, What Kind of Peace; Fetherstone, ‘Peacekeeping’.
59 John Heathershaw, ‘Peacebuilding as Practice: Discourses from Post-Conflict Tajikistan’, 
International Peacekeeping 14, no.2 (2007): 219-236
60 John Heathershaw, ‘Seeing like the International Community:  How Peacebuilding Failed 
(and Survived) in Tajikistan’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. 2, no. 3 (2008), 
forthcoming.
61 Paris, At War’s End. 
62 Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1999).
63 Paris, At War’s End.
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such  as  Azar’s  concept of  ‘protracted social  conflicts’ and  Burton’s  ‘deep-rooted 
conflicts’ and ‘basic human needs’ have contributed to the peace as justice tradition.64 
More recently many such scholars have come to focus on ‘relationships’ or ‘people-to-
people’ peacebuilding.65  Two  commensurable peace-as-justice  orientations  remain 
hugely  influential  in  the  development of  conflict  resolution  theory  and  practice; 
Christian humanism and secular humanitarianism and developmentalism.    
Religious groups, including those of a Christian or Gandhian hue, are often 
amongst the primary actors in peacebuilding projects.  Foremost among the exponents 
of  this  Christian  humanist  perspective  is  John  Paul  Lederach,  who  defines 
peacebuilding as  the  transformation of  ‘conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful 
relationships’.66  Such relationships, according to Lederach, are held together by four 
‘social energies’ – Brother Justice, Sister Truth, Brother Mercy, and Sister Peace.  This 
represents an understanding of peace which he takes directly from Psalm 85.  Rather 
than advocate grand strategies or institutions, Lederach recommends the creation of 
social  spaces  of  reconciliation.67  Such  spaces  are  brought  about  in  part  by  the 
deliberate action of peacemakers and in part by a divinely inspired meeting of minds 
which  is  explored  in  most  detail  in  his  latest  work,  The  Moral  Imagination. 
‘Transcending violence,’ he contends, ‘is forged by the capacity to generate, mobilise, 
and build the moral imagination’.68   
The idea of ‘civil society’ brings this kind of community peace work from the 
religious fringes into the secular mainstream.  This was exhibited in an emphasis on the 
role of the military in humanitarian operations from the mid-1990s (see Slim 1996), 
and the massive expansion of  the role  of international NGOs and their local sub-
contracting partners in post-conflict settings.  Here relational and contextual approaches 
are usurped by generalisable  models focused on SMART targets and adaptable to 
locations across the globe.69  Civil society proved a popular alternative with donors 
when state-centric democratic peacebuilding experienced public and undeniable failure. 
The  high-profile tragedies  of  the  early-1990s  in  Africa  and  the  Balkans,  led  to 
substantial criticism of the UN and third-party intervention more generally.70  Within 
the  international  community  such criticism led,  for  many donors,  to  an  increased 
interest in civil society approaches through NGOs.  Thus, the negative experiences and 
‘lessons learnt’ of  Rwanda and Somalia demnded attempts  to  engage more at  the 
‘grassroots’, with ‘civil society’, and avoid ‘state-centric’ approaches.  Suddenly civil 
society-based approaches such as  ‘multi-track diplomacy’ and ‘local  capacities for 
peace’ became en vogue in international discourse.71  Such authors even demanded the 
64 Johan Galtung, ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peace-making and Peace-
building,’ in Peace, War and Defence – Essays in Peace Research 2, (Copenhagen: Christian 
Ejlers, 1975): 282-304; see, Edward E. Azar, and John W. Burton eds. International conflict  
resolution: theory and practice (Boulder, Colo. : Wheatsheaf : L. Rienner Publishers, 1986); 
John Burton, Conflict: resolution and prevention (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990).
65 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); Michelle I. Gawerc, ‘Peace-
building: theoretical and concrete perspectives,’ Peace and Change  31, no.4 (2006): 435-478.
66 Lederach, Building Peace, 20.
67 Ibid., 29.
68 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 5.
69 SMART targets are specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-limited.
70 Ben Barber, ‘Feeding Refugees, or War? The dilemma of humanitarian aid,’ Foreign Affairs 
76, no.4, (1997): 8-14; Edward N Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance.’ Foreign Affairs 78, no.4, 
(1999): 36-48.
71 Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds, Herding cats: multiparty 
mediation in a complex world, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1999); Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War (Boulder: Lynne 
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re-conceptualisation of war to mark out changes in its practice since the Cold War era 
with Kaldor drawing a fashionable distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars.72  New 
wars require new approaches, it was argued, at the level of civil society.
However, the development of new techniques for civil society peacebuilding 
obscures a highly political debate on the nature of civil society between radicals and 
moderates.  In its most radical form, civil society peacebuilding demands the taming of 
power politics for humanitarian ends as in Kaldor’s hope for a ‘robust peacekeeping’. 
The key question, she argues, is ‘whether the capacity for regulating violence can be 
reinstituted in some way on a transnational basis and whether barbarism can be checked 
by an alert and active cosmopolitan citizenry’.73  Yet most civil society actors obfuscate 
or  deny their  political  potential  by  continuing to  emphasise their  apartness from 
politics.  Criticism of the ‘neutrality’ principle led civil society actors to recast it as a 
contingent  ‘impartiality’,  understood  paradigmatically in  terms of  ‘do  no  harm’.74 
However, this restatement of humanitarian ethics once again refuses to recognise the 
extent of the broader political and economic contexts which aid agencies inhabit.75 
Gawerc, for example, after considering radical and political realist critiques of ‘people-
to-people’ peacebuilding, notes, ‘in many ways, it  comes down to whether conflict 
groups trust each other with regard to the purpose of integrative/cross-cutting ties’.76 
This  simplistic  reduction  of  civil  society  to  a  universal  human  institution  is  a 
moderating, depoliticising move which obscures the conflicts of interests and  idea 
found between peacebuilding discourses.
Statebuilding: peace-as-order
Despite the growing strength of the idea of civil society in the peacebuilding discourse 
of  the  mid-1990s,  the  political  dynamics  of  the  International  Community  were 
engendering a  U-turn  in  policy  priorities.   This  statebuilding  approach  can  be 
considered a new iteration of  peace-as-order in that it relegates the pacifying powers 
of civil society via a conservative or realist discourse of politics.  In apparent retreat to 
a minimalist reading of peacebuilding, Boutros-Ghali reaffirmed, in the supplement to 
Agenda for Peace of 1995, that, ‘respect for [the State’s] fundamental sovereignty and 
integrity  are  crucial  to  any  common international  progress’.77  This  emphasis on 
sovereignty  and  the  norm  of  non-intervention  ironically  foreshadowed the  later 
development  of  statebuilding  and  increasing  move  away  from  non-intervention. 
Contemporary advocates of state-building insist on the primacy of the sovereign state 
in post-conflict spaces whilst arguing that such states must be built under conditions of 
international military intervention.   It  is  this  normative contradiction which is  the 
primary feature of statebuilding discourse.  Statebuilding is wrought by contradiction in 
Rienner, 1999).
72 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press 2001).
73 Mary Kaldor, ‘Reconceptualising Organised Violence,’ in Re-imagining Political Community: 
studies in cosmopolitan democracy, eds. Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 107-109.
74 Anderson, Do No Harm.
75 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and 
Security, (London: Zed Books, 2002).
76 Gawerc, ‘Peace-building’, 461.
77 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary 
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 3 January 1995, 
A/50/60 – S/1995/1, 103, 105.
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offering an even stronger challenge to the principle of non-intervention in domestic 
affairs than that implied by radical ‘civil society’ discourse.
Statebuilding texts bear resemblance to explanations of incremental political 
development  emanating  from  a  further  related  body  of  literature  –  that  of 
modernisation.   Modernisation in turn shares significant ground with pact-based and 
institutionalist  understandings  of  democratisation  and  involves some of  the  same 
theoreticians.  Samuel Huntington in an earlier influential work,  Political Order in 
Changing  Societies,  utilises  an  explicitly  conservative  understanding  of  political 
development where modernisation is the institutionalisation of power relations.  His 
1968 study begins,
The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of 
government but their degree of government.   The differences between democracy 
and dictatorship are less than those countries whose politics embodies consensus, 
community, legitimacy, organisation, effectiveness, and stability, and those countries 
where politics is deficient in these qualities.78       
Such order-based explanations  of  change relegate social  justice  or  wider  political 
participation  to  matters  of  secondary  importance. Modernisation  has  gone  out  of 
fashion as an approach to development.  However, many similar ideas, and some of the 
same authors are popping up today to advocate an approach of ‘nation-building’ or 
‘state-building’.  These terms are often used interchangeably in policy discourse.  
The target of statebuilding is the ‘failed state’.  A failed state, to state-builders, 
who are often political realists,  is  an environment much like international anarchy. 
Cohen et al’s seminal article argued that the degree of anarchy, or ‘the lower the initial 
level of state power, the stronger the relationship between rate of state expansion and 
collective violence’.79  The discursive development of ‘statebuilding’ and its subject of 
the ‘failed state’ intensified in the early-1990s following Jackson’s influential study of 
quasi-states.80  Helman & Ratner and Zartman used the notions respectively of ‘failed’ 
and ‘collapsed’ states to explain the crises of post-colonialism, particularly in Africa.81 
In 1994, the CIA funded a multi-year, multi-disciplinary research programme named 
The State Failure Task Force.  Yet following the failures of the early-1990s, the retreat 
of Supplement to Agenda for Peace and the Clinton administration’s return to a more 
multilateral  approach to  foreign  policy  ‘state  failure’ lost  profile  as  a  discursive 
signifier.   
In the twenty-first century statebuilding has enjoyed a second wind.  As Call 
observes, it was the 9/11 attacks which, ‘drew attention to state failure, bring ‘failed 
states’ into the top tier of US security interests’.82  The subsequent 2002 US National 
Security Strategy identified ‘failing’ states as a source of insecurity and terrorism.83 
Thus  the  academic  idea  of  the  ‘failed state’ has  been incorporated in  the  grand 
78 Samuel P. Huntington, Political order in changing societies, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1968), 1.  
79 Youssef Cohen,, Brian R. Brown and A.F.K. Organski, ‘The Paradoxical Nature of State-
Making: The Violent Creation of Order,’ American Political Science Review 75, no.4 (1981), 
905.
80 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1990).
81 Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States,’ Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-
1993): 3-20; William I. Zartman, Collapsed states : the disintegration and restoration of 
legitimate authority, (Boulder, Colo. : London : L. Rienner, 1995).
82 Charles Call, ‘The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’,’ a paper presented at the International 
Studies Association annual meeting, San Diego, 25 March 2006, 20-21.
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narratives of policy-makers, and developed as the justification for interventions and 
post-conflict  operations in  Afghanistan and Iraq under the  mantra of  the  ‘war  on 
terror’.84  In this context, statebuilding is often labeled as ‘nation-building’.85  Similarly, 
a  recent  book by  Francis  Fukuyama defines  the  process of  statebuilding  as,  ‘the 
creation of  new government institutions  and  the  strengthening  of  existing  ones’.86 
Military  force  is  seen  as  intrinsic  to  this  process,  as  in  Dobbins’ definition  of 
statebuilding: ‘to  use  military power in  the aftermath of a  conflict  to  underpin an 
enduring transition to democracy’.87  US government and military representatives have 
come to use the title ‘stabilisation and reconstruction’ to describe this process.88  
By  2008,  statebuilding and its  enemy and ideal  others  of  the  ‘failed’ and 
‘sovereign’ state, had risen to be the dominant theme of peacebuilding discussions and 
had developed a substantial academic, policy-making and even popular literature.89 The 
number of  research  projects  aimed at  identifying  variables and  ‘measuring’ state 
sovereignty in quantitative and qualitative terms proliferated.  Those who made their 
names in  the critique of democratic peacebuilding are now oft-cited advocates for 
statebuilding.90  One project measured state sovereignty with a quantitative index in 
order,  to  ‘allow an  overall assessment to  be  made of  whether the  multiplicity  of 
interventions  by  a  wide  array  of  international  actors  is  closing  or  widening  the 
sovereignty  gap’.91  This  notion  of  ‘sovereignty  gap’ exhibits  both  a  normative 
preoccupation and an objectivist understanding of state sovereignty.  
The principal and rather obvious problem with this idea of an objective process 
of statebuilding is that it fails to grasp the vital subjective and symbolic dimensions of 
state sovereignty and political authority more broadly.  Policy-makers pay lip-service to 
these dimensions whilst  never exploring their logical consequences.  For example, 
former  US  Ambassador  to  Afghanistan  and  later  Ambassador  to  Iraq,  Zalmay 
Khalilzad, defines US efforts in Afghanistan under this mantra as the effort to ‘establish 
a  legitimate political process and rebuild state institutions’.92  Yet  legitimacy,  as is 
almost  universally  accepted  in  the  academy,  has  a  subjective  or  inter-subjective 
quality.93  It is deemed or interpreted.  In other words it is produced in forms of consent, 
83 United States of America, The National Security Strategy of the United States of  
America. 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, September 2002, accessed: 11 
Nov. 2005, 1
84 For a defence of such operations see, Zalmay Khalilzad, ‘How to Nation-Build: ten lessons 
from Afghanistan,’ The National Interest 80 (Summer 2005): pp.19–28; for a critique of their 
application in Iraq see Charles Tripp, ‘The United States and state-building in Iraq.’ Review of 
International Studies 30, no.4 (2004): 545 - 58.
85 Chesterman, ‘Bush, the United Nations and Nation-building’, 114.
86 Fukuyama, Statebuilding.
87 James F. Dobbins, ‘America’s Enduring Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq,’ 
Survival 45, no.4, (2003-2004), 87.
88 Berger and Scowcroft, ‘In Wake of War’.
89 For a discussion of the rise of statebuilding see, John Heathershaw and Daniel Lambach, 
‘Introduction: Post-Conflict Spaces in International Relations’, Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 2, no. 3 (2008), forthcoming.
90 Paris, At War’s End.
91 Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An 
Approach to State-Building, Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 253, London, 
September 2005, 5.
92 Ibid., 1, my emphasis.
93 For a rendition of legitimacy as a subjective concept related to identity see, Rodney Barker, 
Legitimating Identities: the self-presentations of rulers and subjects (Cambridge: CUP, 2001); 
for an inter-subjective conceptualisation see, David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power 
(London: MacMillan 1991).
13
institutions and rules, and maintained by beliefs.94  Thus, it is unclear how it can be 
based exclusively on increased material resources and the ostensible reform of formal 
institutions of governance, particularly those supplied or demanded by external powers. 
This fundamental contradiction of statebuilding is inherent with the ongoing failure of 
US-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan to actually build a state which is not entirely 
reliant on the support of occupying forces.  
94 Beetham, The Legitimation of Power.
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Merging: ‘Pragmatic’ Peacebuilding
It is readily apparent that peacebuilding as an analytical concept is ‘elastic’ or even 
amorphous.95  The application of  liberalisation  of  both  the  economy and  political 
system to post-conflict spaces takes place without substantive empirical evidence of 
success.   In  this  vein,  ten  years  after  AfP,  Lund  argued  for  an  evaluation  and 
consolidation of existing approaches to peacebuilding.
A line needs to be drawn between peacebuilding and maximising the various levels of 
social, economic and political development possible in a given society.  Otherwise, if 
the term peacebuilding becomes a synonym for all the positive things we would want 
to include in development in order to reduce any and all of societies’ ills, it becomes 
useless for guiding knowledge gathering and practical purposes.96      
There are few in the study and practice of peacebuilding that would disagree with this 
noble aim.  Considering themselves to be pragmatists, they offer moderate critiques of 
international practice but reproduce the basic discursive environment that includes and 
blends the three neoliberal alternatives of democratic peacebuilding, civil society and 
statebuilding.
This  merging  of  peacebuilding  discourses  is  difficult  to  analyse.   Post-
structuralist discourse analysts chart ‘inter-textuality’ – the referencing (or plagiarising) 
of texts in other texts.  This is a useful strategy with regard to the academic literature on 
peace operations  yet  is  of  limited utility  with  respect to  policy and programmatic 
literature.  Many recent policy texts have been written or influenced by academics and 
have been heavily influenced by other policy and academic studies.97  Indeed, there is 
extraordinary and apparently growing cross-fertilisation between the  academic and 
policy worlds as academics are employed as consultants and research is increasingly 
purchased by international donors.98   However, a major UN report, for example, is 
unlikely to include more than a bare minimum of references and acknowledgements. 
Nevertheless one can observe more broadly (and less precisely)  how these reports 
incorporate the hegemonic ideas of the academic and policy worlds with regard to 
peacebuilding.  This  final part reveals some of this  inter-textuality and  hegemonic 
incorporation in peacebuilding.    
Incorporation to one standard model: policy developments
Recent  international  reports  on  intervention  and  peace operations  have  sought  to 
consolidate  peacebuilding  through  the  incorporation of  moderate  criticism  and  a 
strategic policy realignment which reflects the rise of statebuilding discourse.  The 
Brahimi Report of 2000, for example, attempted something of a discursive re-joining of 
military  and  humanitarian  intervention  through  the  notion  of  interdependent 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  Accordingly, ‘force alone cannot create peace; it can 
95 Charles-Philip David, ‘Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the peace 
process,’ Security Dialogue 30, no.1 (1999): 25-41.
96 Lund, What kind of peace?, 28.
97 For example, the UN report, A More Secure World, was lead-authored by Stephen Stedman 
with the assistance of other policy-practitioners.  The 2005 Human Security Report was 
authored by Andrew Mack and colleagues at the University of British Columbia. 
98 An interesting discussion of the reasons for this out-sourcing of expertise by the 
International Community is found in Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, 257-
265.
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only create the space in which peace must be built’.99  Similarly,  the report of the 
International  Commission  on  Intervention  and  State  Sovereignty  (ICISS),  The 
Responsibility to Protect  (R2P) blends a humanitarian civil society perspective with 
that  of  statebuilding  and  explicitly  challenges the  ambiguity  with  regard to  state 
sovereignty found in AfP.100  R2P seeks to push the frequency, duration and extent of 
intervention  beyond  that  implied  by  democratic  peacebuilding  by  including  the 
responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild.101  However, it places emphasis first on the 
protection of the individual, rather than the constitution of a system of sovereign states. 
Furthermore,  the  authors  that  the  International  Community  is  represented  most 
legitimately by the United Nations rather than a state or states which claim to act on the 
part  of  the  ‘international  community’.102  They demand a  just  cause based on the 
prevention of ‘large scale loss of life’ and ‘large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’,’ and adapt the 
principles of Augustinian just war as the basis for military intervention.103  
This  merging  of  justice  and  order  is  emblematic  of  the  practices  of 
incorporation in peacebuilding’s discursive environment.  The Report of the UN High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,  A more secure world: Our shared 
responsibility (MSW)104 draws on R2P.  MSW places the state as the primary subject of 
peacebuilding  but  maintains  the  ideal  of  the  universal  space  of  the  International 
Community, where a universal model of state sovereignty must be adhered to in order 
to preclude international intervention.  While the report addresses collective security in 
its broadest sense, one of its headline conclusions was the proposal for a Peacebuilding 
Commission, ‘whose task’, wrote Kofi Annan in the foreword to the MSW report, 
‘would be to help states make a successful transition from the immediate post-conflict 
phase to longer-term reconstruction and development’.105  
These proposals represent an emerging  peacebuilding meta-discourse which 
attempts to reconcile the various ethical, spatial and temporal ideals represented in the 
three discourses outlined above.  As  such MSW seeks  to  please everyone –  both 
humanitarians who demand that the rights of the individuals must be placed above the 
sovereignty of the state, and statebuilders who believe that juridical sovereignty should 
be built from without in the case of ‘failed states.’  It is thus highly interventionist.  The 
Peacebuilding Commission is  envisioned as  a  part  of  the UN system in  order ‘to 
identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards state collapse’.106 
‘Today,’ the report notes, ‘we are in an era where dozens of states are under stress or 
recovering from conflict, there is  a clear international obligation to assist states in  
developing  their  capacity  to  perform  their  sovereign  functions  effectively  and 
99 United Nations, The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [‘The 
Brahimi Report’], 2000, available at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace-operations/, 
accessed: 14 June 2004.
100 ICISS was established by the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrietien, in September 2000 
in response to Kofi Annan’s challenge to the UN General Assembly to unite on the question 
of ‘humanitarian intervention’ following the Kosovo military intervention of 1999.  
101 International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), xi.
102 Ibid., 9. The commission in fact avoids using the term of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in 
order to respond to the concern of self-styled humanitarian relief agencies that the term 
humanitarian is being militarised by such military interventions.  
103 Ibid., .xii.
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responsibly’.107  If these powers were institutionalised, the Commission would shift the 
UN further away from principles of sovereign consent and blur the distinctions between 
peacebuilding and peace enforcement.  MSW amounts to the clearest case for a two-tier 
system of sovereign states (subjects of intervention and objects of intervention) since 
nineteenth century advocacy for colonialism.  
Policy texts such as R2P and MSW indicate that while the three discourses are 
analytically separable they are in no sense independent from one another.  Civil society 
peacebuilding  and  statebuilding,  whilst  articulated  against  one  another,  are  both 
strongly interdependent.  They are often explored in the literature on peacebuilding in 
terms of  bottom-up and  top-down dynamics based on, respectively,  the concepts of 
‘civil society’ and ‘good governance’.  Prendergast and Plumb, for example, argue that, 
‘there needs to be, alongside the top-down implementation of the peace agreement, 
concurrent bottom-up processes aimed at constructing a new social contract and healing 
societal  divisions’.108  In  the  International  Community  this  remains  a  persuasive 
argument for the incorporation of contrasting orientations into a synthesised concept of 
peacebuilding.  In such terms those involved in interventions explicitly disregard any 
theoretical  bias  or  ideological  bent  to  their  work, claiming simply that  it  is  both 
pragmatic and broad in scope. 
Incorporation in praxis: the merging of development and security
Incorporation exists not merely at the level of high-policy but dramatically affects the 
practices,  programmes  and  relationships  on  the  International  Community.   Mark 
Duffield has charted this from the mid-1990s in terms of the merging of development 
and security.109  This process of merging, he argues, has had two phases which correlate 
with the births of apparently contending civil society and statebuilding discourses.  The 
first phase was the incorporating of the language of security by non-governmental 
actors into humanitarian discourse and the concomitant adoption of developmentalist 
language by militaries and defence ministries.  Duffield shows how this began with the 
post-Cold War ‘radicalisation’ of development and its incorporation to peacebuilding. 
This launched the concepts of ‘Security Sector Reform’ (SSR) and ‘human security’ in 
the  mid-1990s  and  made  security  a  humanitarian  issue.   SSR  thus  became  a 
conceptually credible representation of the merger of security and development.  The 
German  Development  Corporation, for  example,  and  with  reference  to  the  UN 
Development Programme, equated SSR with ‘guaranteeing human security’ as well as 
‘national security’ – an approach which has also been adopted by the OSCE.110  The 
merging of security and development remains a powerful discourse.   ‘Packaged so 
neatly,’ Chanaa notes, ‘it was easy to present, attracting not only attention, but also 
considerable material support’.111  
Since 9/11, however, a second stage has ensued where SSR and development 
have been re-inscribed once more in terms of statebuilding, with a limited role for civil 
society actors.  This has corresponded with a significant rise in military assistance by 
the  United  States,  particularly  to  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  but  also  to  other  equally 
107 Ibid., emphasis added.
108 John Prendergast, and Emily Plumb, ‘Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to 
Peacebuilding’, in Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements, eds. Stephen 
John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002), 327-349.
109 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars.
110 Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects. Adelphi Paper 344 




problematic state partners under the war on terror such as Uzbekistan from 2002-2005. 
Duffield’s work highlights the significance of this merger of security/development for 
the nature of world order.  Writing at the end of the 1990s he notes with far-sightedness 
that  ‘the  idea  of  underdevelopment as  dangerous  and  destabilising  provides  a 
justification for continued surveillance and engagement [in  countries  of  the global 
South]’.112  The idea of dangerous underdevelopment – embodied in tropes such as 
‘failed states’, ‘bad civil society’ and ‘extremism’ – is replete through major policy 
texts put out by development and defence ministries alike.  ‘Failed states’, for example, 
serves as a justification for statebuilding interventions in both the US National Security 
Strategy of 2002 and the UK Department for International Development White Paper of 
2006.113  Duffield is surely right to see in the merging of development and security ‘that 
liberal peace contains within it the emerging structures of liberal war’ (2001: 15).  In 
Duffield’s terms, the contemporary discursive environment of peacebuilding indicates 
‘a susceptibility within global liberal governance to normalise violence and accept high 
levels of instability as an enduring if unfortunate characteristic of certain regions’.114  
Incorporating critique: a new dogma? 
Perhaps the strongest indicator of this inter-textual process of synthesis is found in how 
apparently critical works are incorporated by discourse and become the new dogma.  In 
such a way apparent critiques become the new grand strategy for peacebuilding which 
reflects  discursive  developments  (towards  statebuilding)  and  looks  not  all  that 
dissimilar from their predecessors.  The influential  works  of  Roland Paris offer a 
moderate critique  which  has  provided momentum to  the  new peacebuilding-cum-
statebuilding direction of pragmatists.   
  Paris, in a widely cited article, ‘Wilson’s Ghost’, argued that peacebuilding is 
guided by the doctrine of liberal internationalism while ‘transplanting western models 
of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states’.115  A standard 
operating procedure for liberalisation – involving competitive elections and a reduced 
role for the state in the economy – was adopted, often counter-productively,  in all 
fourteen cases reviewed by Paris in a later study.116   His work contributes to a weight 
of qualitative evidence suggesting that actual post-conflict cases can rarely be made to 
fit the criteria for successful peacebuilding.  Yet while Paris’s earlier work was critical 
of  peacebuilding,  his  more  recent  reform-orientated  work  has  been  consistently 
moderate.    He  calls  for  an  adjustment  of  peacebuilding  practice  in  terms  of 
‘institutionalisation  before  liberalisation’ (IBL),  thus  ‘avoiding  the  pathologies  of 
liberalisation, while placing war-shattered states on a long-term path to democracy and 
market-oriented economics’.117  He characterises this as the thought of ‘classical liberal 
theorists’ rather than ‘Wilsonianism’,118 but  this  approach is  remarkably similar to 
Huntington’s developmentalism of the 1960s119 and in this sense it reflects and furthers 
112 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, 7.
113 USA, National Security Strategy; Department for International Development [DFID], 
Eliminating World Poverty: making governance work for the poor, white paper of the UK Government, 
July 2006.
114 Ibid, 17.
115 Roland Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International 
Security 22, no.2, (1997), 56; see also, Roland Paris, ‘International peacebuilding and the 
‘mission civilisatrice.’’ Review of International Studies 28, no.4 (2002): 637-656.
116 Paris, At War’s End.
117 Paris, At War’s End, 235.
118 Ibid.
119 Michael Dodson, ‘Postconflict Development and Peace Building: Recent Research.’ Peace 
& Change  31, no.2, (2006), 246.
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an  overall  discursive  trend  towards  statebuilding.120  As  Paris  himself  puts  it 
peacebuilding must involve, ‘building liberal and effective states’.121  At the same time 
his work emphasises the need to promote ‘good civil society’ and ‘control hate speech’, 
much like civil society peacebuilding.122  
However, this search for a new consensus represents less of a shift away from 
the liberal peace than the author imagines.  Moreover,  the manner in  which Paris 
develops his argument serves to regenerate the very hegemonic liberal peace which he 
seeks to critique and replace.  IBL is an attempt at a revised synthesis which, in terms 
of  both  its  content  and  synthesising  function,  is  comparable  to  the  pragmatic 
peacebuilding texts such as MSW and R2P.  The discursive incorporation which they 
represent  constitutes  a  further  realignment  of  neo-liberal  temporal  and  spatial 
conceptions.  The attempt to rescue and reform peacebuilding – rather than comprehend 
it  as  a  functional  ‘myth’ and/or  thoroughly  reconceptualise  it  –  characterises the 
moderate criticism of  many pragmatists  who work directly with  the  International 
Community and are orientated towards policy prescription.  Such texts obfuscate the 
distinction between humanitarian and military interventions which was at  one time 
inviolable  in  the  International  Community.   Since  Kosovo,  many  liberal  public 
intellectuals have come to the defence of such mergers, for example Ulrich Beck’s 
notion  of  ‘militaristic  humanitarianism’.123  Michael  Ignatieff,  for  example, whilst 
criticising the failure of the interventionists to take imperial responsibility, defends the 
use of military intervention and ‘imperial policing’ in explicit advocacy for what he 
calls ‘Empire lite’ – another idea which relies heavily on the inter-textual connections 
of justice and order.  He argues:
Imperialism used to be the white man’s burden.  This gave it a bad reputation.  But 
imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes politically 
incorrect.  Nations sometimes fail, and when they do outside help – imperial power – 
can get them back on their feet.  Nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in 
an human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of 
small nations to govern themselves and their own right to rule the world.124
Such  interpellation  of  discourses,  where  military-led  statebuilding  comes  to  be 
portrayed as  humanitarian,  and  humanitarianism  as  necessarily requiring  military 
intervention, illustrates the intense inter-textuality of peacebuilding.  It also indicates 
the hegemonic position of the International Community as a legitimate agent of diverse 
acts  of  intervention.   By 2008,  five years into  the  Iraq war and ‘nation-building’ 
venture, ‘peacebuilding’ lives on but its essential quality is as hard to distinguish as 
ever.  It retains a tri-partite character, being at times one peacebuilding and at times 
three  (see  figure  2).   Through  such  discursive  practices  of  incorporation,  the 
International Community battles to re-present the liberal peace.   
120 Paris quotes extensively and affirmatively from Huntingdon, Political Development, whilst 
raising concerns about his enthusiasm for transition via military government. Paris, At War’s 
End, 185-187.
121 Roland Paris, ‘Bringing the Leviathan Back In: Classical Versus Contemporary Studies of 
the Liberal Peace’, International Studies Review 8, no.3 (2006), 425.
122 Paris, At War’s End, 179-211.
123 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, (London: Verso, 2000), 56-57.
124 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Nation-Building Lite,’ New York Times Magazine, 28 July 2002, 26.
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This paper has assessed the dynamics of the ‘liberal peace’ in terms of the shift from peace 
to peacebuilding and on, within the discursive space of peacebuilding, to statebuilding.  It 
charted the development of peacebuilding not as consistent, ‘experience-led’ or ‘evidence-
based’ but as a highly political process of inter-textual relations and incorporative practices 
of the International Community.  Neo-liberal, international peacebuilding’s very durability 
is a product of the dynamism of its discursive environment.  
This paper makes three conclusions and three propositions about regarding the tri-
partite peacebuilding of the post-Cold War era.  The first conclusion is that peacebuilding 
is trinitarian and in conflict.  That is, it takes place in a discursive environment of conflict, 
of  competing inscriptions.   Despite  the  shift  from ‘peace’ to  ‘peacebuilding’,  Banks’ 
concepts  of  peace  (conflict  management;  order;  justice)  have  been  reconstituted  in 
peacebuilding through variations upon the theme in the form of civil society (humanitarian) 
and statebuilding discourses.  Second, peacebuilding becomes, in moments, unitarian and 
homogenous.  That is, these contentions are frequently elided in a single meta-discourse. 
The conflict between three basic discourses provides the dynamism and the parameters by 
which peacebuilding as a ‘pragmatic’ concept is regenerated.  The contrasts between them 
indicate the essentially contested and shifting nature of pragmatic peacebuilding, while 
their conciliation under grand narratives exhibits the nature of hegemonic incorporation. 
Thirdly,  peacebuilding is not essentially liberal.  Nor, despite its tripartite structure, is it 
properly plural.  In this sense it is neoliberal.  There are well-defined limits on the extent to 
which peacebuilding can evolve in the international discursive environment.  But this is not 
to say it is entirely technical.  Rather it is a form of governmentality where ethical, spatial 
and temporal shift markers inconsistently under a hybrid liberal-conservative-humanitarian 
mode of hegemonic governance.  
These three conclusions about the discursive environment of peacebuilding give 
rise to three propositions about the changing nature of world order since 1989.  In each of 
the  subsequent  three  proposals  ‘contemporary world  order’  could  be  substituted  for 
‘peacebuilding’ to convey this meaning.  First, peacebuilding is practically imperial.  In its 
focus  on  ethnopolitical  conflict,  peacebuilding  justifies  a  degree  of  international 
intervention within ‘failed states’ which has  been formally absent since the decline of 
colonialism after the Second World War.  Whether or not we identify the contemporary 
international order as  that  of  Empire, we must  acknowledge the imperial practices of 
contemporary international peacebuilding.  Secondly,  peacebuilding necessarily fails to 
live up to its ideals.  The very nature of peacebuilding (as a discourse which idealises and 
attempts to ‘self-legitimate’ the International Community) institutionalises a gaping chasm 
between what is represented and what is practiced.  Its ‘goals’ are self-images which must 
be simulated in the other.  As Richmond argues, it is a ‘virtual peace’ in that it is ‘mainly 
visible to those observing from the outside of the conflict zone in the liberal international 
community rather than those upon whom this peace is being visited’.125  Finally, and in 
keeping with the first proposition, peacebuilding represents the mutual inclusiveness of the 
idea of peace and the practice of war.  Earlier invocations of the concept of peace – as an 
orderly balance of power (a negative peace) or an inclusive system of social justice (a 
positive peace) – gave rise to the idea that peace and war were mutually exclusive.  This 
mutual exclusivity has been questioned from Tacitus to George W. Bush.126  Today, the 
125 Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, 185.
126 Tacitus wrote in reporting the speech of Calgacus, a leader of the Britons: ‘To robbery, 
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process of international peacebuilding takes place ‘over generations’ and its endpoint is 
rarely if  ever defined.  Peacebuilding provides a  widely accepted justification  for the 
permanence of war or very high levels of organised violence in post-conflict spaces.  Under 
peacebuilding war and ‘peace’ are always with us.
John Heathershaw is Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics at the 
University of Exeter
butchery, and rapine they give the lying name of ‘government’; they create a desolation and call it 
peace’.  See, Tacitus, The Agricola and the Germania, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 
1970), 81.  George W. Bush named the United States as a ‘peaceful people’ when embarking upon 
war with Iraq.
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